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England’s post-Reformation demographic regime has been characterized as 
‘low pressure’.  Yet the evidence hitherto for the presence of a preventive check, 
defined as the short-run response of marriage and births to variations in living 
standards, is rather weak.  New evidence in this paper strengthens the case for the 
preventive check in both medieval and early modern England.  We invoke manorial 
data to argue the case for a preventive check on marriages in the middle ages.  Our 
analysis of the post-1540 period, based on parish-level rather than aggregate data, 




THE PREVENTIVE CHECK IN MEDIEVAL AND PRE-INDUSTRIAL ENGLAND 
 
When Thomas Robert Malthus first proposed his concept of the 
‘preventive check’ in 1798 he believed that it described a mechanism 
prevalent across the socio-economic spectrum in England.  The constraint on 
the birth rate, due to ‘a foresight of the difficulties of rearing of a family’, 
operated mainly through delayed marriage and increased rates of celibacy 
(Malthus 1798: chapter 4).
2
Since the early 1980s several statistical studies have addressed 
Malthus’ claim against historical evidence from England.  All combine E. 
Anthony Wrigley and Roger Schofield’s (1981) post-1540 demographic data 
with data on wheat prices or real wages.  All find little if any impact of 
living standards on marriage rates (Lee 1981; Weir 1984; Bailey and 
Chambers 1993; Lee and Anderson 2001; Crafts and Mills 2009). This paper 
uses new data on medieval and early modern marriages and finds, by 
contrast, that a strong positive check operated. 
   
To reconstruct medieval marriages we look at the annual number of 
merchets—fines paid by an unfree peasant for the lord's permission for a 
daughter to marry—on the manors of the Bishops of Winchester from 1269 to 
the arrival of the Black Death in 1348. We find a strong connection between 
changes in wheat prices and subsequent changes in the number of merchets 
paid. For smaller merchets, corresponding to less wealthy tenants, the 
relationship is negative: higher wheat prices deter marriages; whereas for 
                                                 
2   Malthus did not envisage much of a role for the control of births within marriage, 
but this does not exclude a role for malnutrition-induced reductions in births.  
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larger merchets the relationship is positive, suggesting that episodes of high 
food prices that forced indebted peasants to sell off their holdings created 
opportunities for children of wealthier families to acquire the land they 
needed in order to marry. For both groups, in other words, there is a strong 
connection between economic conditions and nuptiality. 
For the period 1540 to 1800 we use Wrigley and Schofield's population 
data but, whereas all existing studies use their aggregate estimates, we look 
at total marriages and births in the 404 parishes on which they based their 
reconstitution. We find a strong impact of real wages on marriages by half-
century up to 1800, whereas the impact of wages on birth rates rises in the 
early eighteenth century, but disappears in the late eighteenth century.  
  The outline of the paper is as follows.  Part 1 reviews the limitations 
of data on merchets as a proxy for marriages.  Part 2 employs data on 
marriage fines in southern and eastern England and asks what they tell us 
about the preventive check.  We find what we consider rather strong 
evidence of the preventive check for the relatively poor but not so for the 
better-off.  Part 3 returns to the issue of the preventive check in England 
between the mid-sixteenth century and the end of the eighteenth century.  









1. Merchets and Marriages 
The merchet was a fine or tax paid by a dependent peasant for the 
lord’s permission to marry a daughter.
3
Several authors have cautioned against inferring marriage rates from 
merchets.  Larry Poos and Richard Smith (1984) cite the implausibly the low 
marriage rate implied by the merchet data derived by Zvi Razi (1980) from 
the manorial records of Halesowen.  Others have linked the tendency for 
the number of merchets to decrease over time to the collapse of the feudal 
system.  There was a big falling off in the number of merchets processed by 
Spalding Priory after the 1390s and a similar pattern is evident in Sutton-in-
the-Isle in Cambridgeshire (Jones 1998: 165; McGibbon Smith 2005).  
However, in Ramsey Abbey in the same county, the annual average number 
  It was not a means of legitimizing 
marriage, since after the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) a valid marriage 
required just two consenting adults.  Indeed, it is quite likely that the 
manor was uninterested in marriages between couples with little or no 
wealth because such marriages were unpromising sources of revenue.  The 
merchet was more akin to a stamp duty, a means of controlling inheritance 
and taxing peasant wealth, so its size varied with the likely value of the 
dowry.  In the manorial court rolls studied by Eleanor Searle the value of 
merchets ranged between 5s and £4 when there was land involved, but 
usually between 6d to 2s in cases where land was not mentioned.  Few 
cottagers appear in the records paying merchets (Searle 1979). 
                                                 
3  The demographic-historical literature on merchets includes May 1973; Searle 
1979; Razi 1980; Bennett 1982; Brand et al. 1983; Poos and Smith 1994; Jones 
1996, 1998; Mueller 1999 ; McGibbon Smith 2005.  
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of merchets was higher in the first half of the fifteenth century than in the 
early fourteenth.
4
  For two main reasons, then— selection bias problems for class and for 
period— merchets are an imperfect indicator of the total number of 
marriages.  However, our focus here is not on the trend in marriages or the 
marriage rate, but on short-term variations in their number.  As long as the 
likelihood of being recorded did not change erratically over time, the year-
to-year movement in marriage fines may offer a rough guide—and no more 
than that—to the variation in marriages.  On this basis, we have constructed 
an annual series of merchets paid on the sixty-five manors located on the 
estates of the bishopric of Winchester in southern England (Britnell 2003; 
Campbell 2003).  We also analyse movements in marriage fines from two 
locations in eastern England.   
 
Our main database, a series derived from the court rolls of the 
Winchester estate, refers to the pre-Black Death era (from the 1260s to the 
1340s). The values of marriage fines by quartile are 12d, 24d, and 80d. At 
the bottom end, the relatively small number of very small fines—nine per 
cent of the total are for 6d, and there are 30 fines of zero, 17 of 1d to 5d—is  
consistent with the tendency to exclude poorer cottagers from merchets. At 
the top end, the maximum fine was 400s, and there were 149 fines of 100s 
or more. The fact that fines varied with wealth allows us to see how the 
                                                 
4  Bennett (1982) counted 426 for 1398-1458 (with data for three years missing), or 
about seven per annum on average, whereas Edward Britton in an unpublished 
study cited by Bennett (1982: 240n6) identified 112 merchets for 1297-1337, or less 




marriage patterns of different social groups responded to changing 
economic conditions by looking at changing numbers of large and small 
fines.  
  While data start in 1263, as in the case of inheritances (Kelly and Ó 
Gráda 2010) the marriage fine data appear to suffer from considerable 
under-reporting before 1269: large manors that always report some fines 
after this date often record zero before it. Our analysis therefore focuses on 
the period from 1269 to 1348.  The five biggest Winchester manors (ranging 
from 432 to 589 marriage fines in total) account for 27 per cent of 
observations; the biggest eleven (with a minimum of 281 fines each) for 50 
per cent; and the biggest twenty (with a minimum of 154 fines) for 71 per 
cent.  Twenty-five smaller manors recorded between one and fifty fines in 
total. 
  Given that the payment of a marriage fine is almost invariably 
associated with land ownership, the number of marriage fines on a manor 
should equal or exceed the number of entry fines: if a couple marries and 
enters a holding the two will be equal, but the death of one spouse followed 
by remarriage of the survivor will cause marriages to exceed land transfers 
over the life cycle. In fact, the median number of merchets per inheritance 
fine was 0.8, with a correlation of 0.88 across manors, indicating the 
expected undercounting of marriages by merchets.     
Figure 1 plots annual numbers of marriage fines, land transfers 
(inheritances, inter-familial transfers, and land sales between unrelated 
individuals) for the largest twenty manors from 1263 to 1348.  An interesting 
feature of the data is the large number of inter-family land sales: about two  
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hundred annually versus 150 for inheritances, although inheritances involved 
larger plots: the median fine size is 80d for inheritances, compared with 
only 40d for intra-family transfers and 24d for inter-family transfers.  Thus 
the typical sale was of a small plot of land, consistent with these 
smallholders being forced to sell in hard times.  It is notable how land sales 
follow wheat prices, a possible indication that high wheat prices put the 
poor under pressure, forcing them to sell their holdings to repay debts to 
wealthier tenants. In plotting deaths measured by entry fines, the figure for 
the first Black Death year of 1348 is truncated at 250 (the actual figure is 
1306) in order to keep all the other inheritance data from crushing along the 
bottom. 
 




2.  The Preventive Check in the Middle Ages: 
What factors determined marriage rates? The first, naturally, is real 
wages or food prices: in times when real wages fell, it took longer for 
couples to accumulate the target wealth felt necessary to independent to 
establish an independent household, so marriage rates should have fallen. 
However, for wealthier families engaged in commercial agriculture, high 
food prices would be a boon, causing marriage to be accelerated. In 
addition, as high food prices caused indebted smallholders to sell their land,  
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richer peasants would have had the opportunity to buy holdings to set their 
children up on. 
The second factor is mortality: marriages rose as the widowed 
remarried, while the young inherited the property that would allow them to 
set up a household. For the manor of Halesowen, Razi (1980: 45-50) found 
that in years where ‘mortality was high and many young villagers inherited 
land or husbands lost their wives, the number of marriages rose sharply’ 
(1980: 47).  However, Razi notes that the Great Famine of 1316-17 was 
exceptional in that ‘although land was available and many husbands 
probably lost their wives, marriages had to be postponed’ (1980: 47). The 
same failure of marriages to rise in 1316-17 can be seen in our Winchester 
data in Figure 1.   
  In what follows we assume the following simple log-linear Malthusian 
model: 
 
     ln(Mt/Nt) = β0 + β′1ln(wt) + β′2ln(Mt-1/N t-1) + β′3ln ln(Dt/Nt) + β′4ln(Xt)         [1] 
 
where M are annual marriages, N is population, w is the real wage, D are 
annual deaths, and X are other variables, such as technology, public charity, 
and urbanization.  The right hand side variables are vectors of current and 
lagged values. Taking first differences we have:  
 




We assume that the relevant population of tenants with holdings large 
enough to make them liable to pay marriage fines is roughly constant so ∆N 
= 0.  This is broadly consistent with Figure 1.  For annual differences we 
assume that the impact of changes of other factors X is negligible: it makes 
sense for the change in marriages from one year to the next to be affected 
by a change in real wages, but hardly by better technology or urbanization, 
although these variables can exert a strong influence over longer periods.  
We therefore estimate: 
 
∆ln(Mt) =  β′1∆ln(wt) + β′2∆ln(Mt-1) + β′3∆ln(Dt)                               [3] 
 
  Table 1 reports the results of regressing marriage fines on wheat 
prices and property transfers (the sum of inheritance taxes, sales, and intra-
family transfers) for the twenty largest manors from 1269, when records 
become reliable, to 1347, the year before the Black Death.  All variables are 
differences of logs, so the coefficients are elasticities.  The first column 
refers to all marriages, the second to those involving fines of 24d or less, 
and the third to fines of over 24d.
5
  It can be seen that a high number of marriages in one year results in 
lower marriages in the next two years.  The overall effect of the price of 
wheat on marriages is negative.  Note, however, that for larger fines the 
impact of lagged fines is marginally positive.  The contemporaneous 
 
                                                 
5  Using a panel model where slopes were allowed to vary across manors did not 
alter the results substantially: these manors are concentrated in a small 
geographical area and represent a fairly homogeneous group of observations, in 
contrast to the parishes spread across England that we consider below.    
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elasticity was -0.1 for small fines and 0.01 for fines over 24d.  The 
cumulative responses after a year were -0.21 and +0.23, respectively; after 
two years they were -0.54 for small fines and +0.40 for larger fines.
6  The 
cumulative estimate of -0.54 for poorer couples is strikingly high compared 
to those by Weir and others reported earlier for a later period. Table 1 also 
indicates that land transfers had no impact for smaller fines, but they had a 




[Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
 
  The negative impact of wheat price on marriages for smaller fines 
supports the standard preventive check story as outlined above: as real 
income fell it took longer to save to reach target wealth for marriage, and 
so marriage was postponed.  The evidence on wealthier peasants is more 
consistent with the finding by Razi (1980: 47) whereby in the wake of years 
                                                 
6  Starting off with mt =  θ1mt-1 + θ2mt-2 + φ0wt + φ1wt-1 - φ2wt-2, 
  the elasticities (ηi, i = 0, … -2) are: 
  η0 = φ0 
  η1 = θ1φ0 + φ1 
  η2 = θ1(θ1φ0 + φ1) + θ2φ0 + φ2 
  Then the cumulative elasticity after two periods is [η0 + η1 +η2]  
7  We also experimented with wheat yields but they produced coefficients that 
were small and insignificant.  Similarly, multiplying yields by wheat prices to get a 
measure of the income of wealthier peasants who were producing grain for the 




of high wheat prices (which drove up the price of other grains also) laborers 
with plots too small to support themselves were plunged into debt, forcing 
them to sell their holdings to the rich. This gave some more prosperous 
landholders an opportunity to marry off their daughters.  We measure 
deaths in the regression by inheritance fines.  However, as Figure 1 shows, 
inheritances are strongly correlated with other property transfers and by 
using total transfers (the sum of inheritances, intra-family transfers, and 
sales) the fit is slightly improved.  We therefore report results for total 
transfers here.  
The outcome predicated by Malthus corresponded closely to the 
‘European marriage pattern’ proposed by John Hajnal (Hajnal 1965).  Like 
Malthus, Hajnal equated marriage with a couple’s economic independence.  
Since this involved the acquisition of both human and physical capital, 
marriage timing could be affected by economic shocks; marriage became ‘a 
movable feast’ (Wrigley et al. 1997: 125).  A series of poor harvests might 
delay a farmer’s ability to pay a daughter’s dowry or his son’s ability to 
accumulate the savings necessary to set out on his own.   
Exactly when England adopted Hajnal’s marriage pattern is still 
unclear.
8
                                                 
8 On the link between Hajnal’s pattern and economic growth see Foreman-Peck 
(2011). 
  Razi’s pioneering study of the manor of Halesowen is sometimes 
interpreted as evidence against Hajnal’s pattern.  But Razi’s finding that in 
a sample of 285 families living in Halesowen between 1280 and 1349 ‘at 
least 139 families (49 per cent) had a son or a daughter… who probably 
married between the ages of 18 and 22’ is hardly conclusive evidence in  
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favour of early marriage (Razi 1980: 63).  On the other hand, Halesowen’s 
poor, whose marriages were less likely to be recorded, probably married 
earlier than the better-off.  Other studies argue for later marriages.  For 
example, H. E. Hallam’s analysis of data on the Lincolnshire Fenlands 
produced estimated mean ages at marriage (22.4 years for women and 25.9 
years for men) that fitted the European marriage pattern.  On the basis of a 
range of evidence drawn from poll taxes, marriage fines, and other sources 
Richard Smith hypothesizes that the Hajnal regime emerged ‘as early as the 
1260s’ while Jeremy Goldberg suggests that it ‘may have developed most 
precociously in the towns and cities’. However the available data on 
marriage age are too patchy for definitive judgments (Hallam 1985; Smith 
1983, 1999: 41-44; Goldberg 2006: 426-27; Razi 1980: 60-64; Bailey 1996).  
Even less is known about mean marriage age in the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries.  By the early seventeenth century mean ages at first marriage 




2.1. Property Transfers: 
  Table 2 reports regressions of inheritances and land sales on wheat 
prices, all variables again differences of logs.  It can be seen that rises in 
wheat prices have a strong impact on mortality in the current and following 
year, with an elasticity in each case of around 0.25.  For sales of land 
between families, high wheat prices one year increase sales next year with 







2.2. Halesowen and Ramsey Abbey: 
Razi (1980: 48, 133) presents data on marriage fines in Halesowen for 
1293-1400, but with data missing for 1296, 1303, 1360, 1365, 1366, and only 
one observation after 1385.  He claimed that in Halesowen peasants married 
‘only when they had land’, which meant that for the rich the wait might not 
be as long as for the poor (1980: 56, 60). Table 5 reports the results of 
regressing marriage fines on wheat prices in Halesowen for 1293-1384.  The 
more robust wheat price regression finds that high wheat prices had a strong 
negative impact on fines.
9
Judith Bennett’s merchet data from Ramsey Abbey in the 
Cambridgeshire fenlands cover a later period (1398-1457, but with data 
missing for 1401-03).  The annual number of marriage fines in Ramsey rose 
with wheat prices, as was the case with larger fines on the Winchester 
estate.  At first sight the positive coefficient on wheat price is surprising, 
but it would make sense if by this time only well-off villains paid marriage 
fines, since such individuals were likely to have been net producers of grain 
and beneficiaries of forced land sales by the poor.  Thus high prices could 
 
                                                 
9   Razi also proposed an alternative merchet series which attempted to correct for 
missing evidence, but since this did not yield better results, the outcome is not 
reported here.  
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have enhanced the marriage opportunities of those who with purchasing 
power to spare. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
 
3. Post-1541: Marriages 
  As noted in the introduction, several previous studies have addressed 
the link between marriages, births, and living standards in early modern 
England. Those studies rely exclusively on the aggregate demographic data 
published in Wrigley and Schofield (1981). Our approach here differs in that 
it applies multi-level regression analysis to the 404 individual parishes 
constituting the Cambridge Group database for five sub-periods from 1539-
1600 to 1751-1800, as in an earlier study of the impact of living standards on 
deaths (Kelly and Ó Gráda 2010). This increases the number of observations 
considerably, and allows us to see how marriage patterns varied across 
parishes.  Coverage improves over time, as the proportion of parishes with 
the relevant records intact rises.  In the absence of long-run data on 
regional wages, living standards are proxied by the national real wage series 
for agricultural laborers provided by Clark (2007).  As above, variables are in 
differences of logs so that the estimated coefficients may be interpreted as 
elasticities. 
  Because we have data for individual parishes we can estimate a 
multilevel regression, allowing the impact of wages and past marriages to 





∆ln(Mt) =  (β1+ β1j)′∆ln(wt) + (β2 + β2j)′ ∆ln(Mt-1)                               [4] 
 
where the vector of random effects across parishes βj = (β′1j, β′2j)′ ∼ N(0, Σβj) 
(Bates 2010). 
The outcome in Table 3 shows that current wages and wages lagged 
one and two years had a very strong impact on marriages throughout.  The 
cumulative responses of marriages up to three lags are reported in Table 4.  
Before 1700 the cumulative impact peaked one year later; thereafter the 
peak occurred two years later.  Overall, the short-term response was 
strongest in 1650-1699, but the high cumulative impact in 1700-1749 
corroborates our earlier finding that this was a challenging half-century in 
demographic terms.  Deaths, by contrast to the medieval data, had virtually 
no impact on marriages. This may reflect greater economic opportunities, or 
simply the fact the medieval data are restricted to moderately prosperous 
farming households whereas the later data include all marriages. 
The preventive check is a good deal stronger than that found in 
earlier studies based on national totals. Weir (1984) estimated the 
cumulative responses of marriages to wheat price at +0.099 in 1640-1739 
and -0.113 in 1740-49; the cumulative responses of fertility were -0.050 and 
-0.164, respectively.  Bailey and Chambers (1993: 357-358), using the real 
wage series constructed by Henry Phelps Brown and Sheila Hopkins (1961) 
rather than wheat prices, reported elasticities of births to real wages at 
between 0.2 to 0.3 and elasticities of the marriage rate at roughly half that  
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for sub-periods between 1542 and 1800.  Nicholas Crafts and Terence Mills 
(2009), using Clark’s real wage data and state space techniques, could find 
no evidence for the preventive check after the mid-seventeenth century.  
All told, these estimates imply a rather weak preventive check; indeed, 
Weir (1984: 43) was struck by how ‘at no time between 1670 and 1830 were 
marriages less responsive to economic shocks in France than in England’. 
 
[Tables 4 and 5 about here] 
 
 
3.1. Post-1541: Births 
  The outcome for births, described in Table 5, resembles that for 
marriages.  The impact of variations in real wages on births before 1750 was 
quite powerful. The cumulative impact, described in Table 6, increased 
during the first half of the eighteenth century, as with deaths (Kelly and Ó 
Gráda 2010); indeed it was strongest in that half-century.  The strong 
preventive check recorded in 1700-1749 probably reflects the impact of 
significant subsistence crises in 1728-30 and 1740-42 (Kelly and Ó Gráda 
2011).  Again the estimated cumulative responses reported here are much 
stronger than those estimated by David Weir (1984: 38, 42) or Ronald Lee 
and Michael Anderson (2001: Table 2). 
Figures 2a and 2b describe the sum of wage coefficients by parish in 
each half-century for marriages and births.  A notable feature in both cases 
is how much the strength of the preventive check in individual parishes 
varied through time before the mid-eighteenth century: individual lines  
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representing parishes frequently cross, so that many parishes with a strong 
(weak) check in one period have a weak (strong) check in the next. The 
variation across parishes in both responses diminished in the eighteenth 
century.  The patterns are geographically random through time, however.  
We discovered no correlation between the strengths of the positive and 
preventive checks across parishes (compare Kelly and Ó Gráda 2010). 
 
[Figures 2a and 2b about here] 
[Tables 6 and 7 about here] 
 
4. Conclusion 
Wrigley and Schofield’s path-breaking research on English population 
history emphasized the ‘low pressure’ character of the demographic regime.  
It built on and confirmed the presence of Hajnal’s European marriage 
pattern and Malthus’s preventive check.  It is ironic, then, that econometric 
studies employing Wrigley and Schofield’s annual data series lent but weak 
support to the presence of a preventive check, when defined as the short-
run response of marriage and births to variations in proxies for the standard 
of living.   
The new evidence produced in this paper strengthens the case for the 
preventive check in both medieval and early modern England.  Our reliance 
on merchets as a proxy for tracking short-run fluctuations in marriages in 
the medieval era is open to criticism, but the outcome can be defended as 
coherent.  Its implication of the presence of a preventive check on 
marriages for poorer tenants is plausible, and its tentative finding that  
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better-off tenants may have benefited from poor harvests interesting.  Our 
analysis of the post-1540 period is based on the same data as previous 
analyses, but our study differs in that employs that data at parish level 
rather than in aggregate.  The outcome offers rather clear-cut evidence of a 
stronger preventive check on marriages and births than found in those 
studies using aggregate data.  Our next step is to discover how the strength 





Table 1. Regressions of annual marriages by manor on wheat prices and land 
transfers, 1269-1347 
 
  All  Below 24d  Above 24d 






Lag Marriages    -0.648 ** 
(0.037) 
  -0.651 ** 
(0.046) 
  -0.595 ** 
(0.052) 
Lag2 Marriages    -0.253 ** 
(0.036) 














  0.225 * 
(0.112) 
Lag2 Price     -0.273 ** 
(0.1) 








    0.217 ** 
 (0.064) 






       
N  664  442  344 
RMSE  0.669  0.701  0.605 
Rsq  0.345  0.321  0.345 
Regressions of annual marriage fines by manor on lagged fines, wheat prices, 
and number of land transfers. All variables are differences of logs. The 
second column uses fines of 24d or less, the third uses fines over 24d. 







Table 2. Regressions of annual inheritances and land sales on wheat prices, 
1269-1347 
 
  Inheritances  Land Sales 
























     
N  708  628 
RMSE  0.664  0.669 
Rsq  0.352  0.284 
Regressions of annual inheritances and inter-family land transfers on wheat 
prices and lagged value of each dependent variable.  All variables are 









Table 3. Regressions of Merchets on Wheat Prices and Real Wages in 
Halesowen and Ramsey Abbey 
 
  Halesowen  Ramsey 
























     
N  50  51 
Period covered  1293-1384  1398-1457 
Adjusted Rsq  0.381  0.465 
Prob>F  0.0001  0.0000 
Regressions of manorial fines on wheat prices and lagged values of both 
variables.  All variables are differences of logs.  ** denotes a coefficient 






Table 4. Regressions of annual marriages by parish on real wages and mortality, 
1539-1800 
 
  1600  1650  1700  1750  1800 




































































































           
Loglik  -6284.3  -11051.1  -12598.2  -12892  12234.1 
N   7,423  13,474  14,545  15,989  17,678 
Parishes  285  377  400  403  403 
Multi-level regression of annual marriages on real wages and mortality. Each 
column is for the period ending on the date listed.  All variables are differences 




Table 5. Cumulative response of marriage to wages, 1540-1800 
Lag  1600  1650  1700  1750  1800 
0  0.399  0.487  0.353  0.413  0.437 
1  0.525  0.754  0.762  0.380  0.370 
2  0.397  0.541  0.715  0.455  0.393 





Table 6. Regressions of annual births by parish on real wages and marriages, 1539-1800 
 
  1600  1650  1700  1750  1800 
Lag Birth     -0.776 ** 
(0.012 
   -0.784 ** 
(0.008) 
  -0.75 ** 
(0.008) 
  -0.809 ** 
(0.008) 
  -0.813 ** 
(0.007) 
Lag2 Birth    -0.451 ** 
(0.013) 
   -0.475 ** 
(0.01) 
  -0.432 ** 
(0.009) 
  -0.473 ** 
(0.009) 
  -0.453 ** 
(0.009) 
Lag3 Birth    0.164 ** 
(0.011) 
  -0.181 ** 
(0.008) 
  -0.175 ** 
(0.008) 
  -0.187 ** 
(0.008) 
  -0.176 ** 
(0.007) 
Wage     0.140 ** 
(0.032) 
   0.201 ** 
(0.028) 
   0.212 ** 
(0.022) 
  0.198 ** 
(0.031) 
  0.112 ** 
(0.033) 
Lag Wage     0.282 ** 
(0.037) 
   0.456 ** 
(0.03) 
   0.331 ** 
(0.022) 
  0.36 ** 
(0.029) 
  0.213 ** 
(0.038) 
Lag2 Wage    0.285 ** 
(0.039) 
   0.225 ** 
(0.027) 
   0.224 ** 
(0.023) 




Lag3 Wage     0.073 ** 
(0.033) 








Marriage  0.012 
(0.007) 
   0.012 ** 
(0.004) 
   0.016 ** 
(0.004) 
   0.01 ** 
(0.004) 
   0.012 ** 
(0.004) 
Lag Marriage     0.043 ** 
(0.008) 
   0.040 ** 
(0.005) 
   0.04 ** 
(0.005) 
   0.046 ** 
(0.005) 
   0.034 ** 
(0.005) 




   0.034 ** 
(0.005) 
   0.046 ** 
(0.005) 
   0.031 ** 
(0.005) 
Lag3 Marriage     0.029 ** 
(0.007) 
   0.026 ** 
(0.004) 
   0.021 ** 
(0.004) 
   0.028 ** 
(0.004) 
   0.022 ** 
(0.004) 
           
Loglik  -2219.8  -2325.6  -3550  -2589.8  -618 
N   7,272  13,748  14,639  16,062  17,777 
Parishes  282  374  400  402  403 
Multi-level regression of annual births on real wages and mortality. Each column is for 
the period ending on the date listed.  All variables are differences of logs. Standard 
errors in parentheses.  ** denotes a coefficient significant at 1 per cent. 
 
 
Table 7. Cumulative response of births to wages, 1540-1800 
Lag  1600  1650  1700  1750  1800 
0  0.140  0.201  0.212  0.198  0.112 
1  0.313  0.499  0.384  0.398  0.234 
2  0.402  0.395  0.381  0.326  0.085 
3  0.328  0.258  0.320  0.508  0.161  
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